

State Safety Programme (SSP) of [Name of the AMS]

SSP top-level (Exposition) Document

Sep 2020

Rev. 1

[Name of accountable person]

[Position]

[Civil Aviation Authority]

Approved:

Template guidance

This document is formatted to allow different users to edit it as their own State's SSP top-level (Exposition) Document.

Consequently, highlighted gaps in **blue** are included in order to be filled with the particular information of each editor. These spaces are highlighted in blue, for instance:

"The SSP of **[AMS name]** is a management system used for regulating and managing safety in our State."

In order to assist the edition of the document, context, exemplification and guidance are provided within it. In this case, this content will be in *italics and highlighted in grey*. Please, remove this content after reading and using it.

**NOTE: PLEASE, REMOVE THIS PAGE WHEN CREATING YOUR
OWN VERSION BASED ON THIS TEMPLATE**

Table of Contents

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY	4
DISTRIBUTION LIST	5
FOREWORD	6
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	8
DEFINITIONS.....	10
PART 1 - GENERAL	13
1 Purpose of this document	13
2 Introduction to [AMS name] State safety programme.....	14
3 [AMS name] challenges and priorities	15
3.1 Challenges	15
3.2 Global, regional and national priorities.....	15
4 [AMS name] aviation system description. Size and complexity of the national industry	16
PART II – STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME COMPONENTS	18
5 SSP Component 1: State safety policy and objectives.....	18
5.1 [AMS name] safety legislative framework.....	18
5.2 Critical Element 1 – Primary aviation legislation	19
5.3 Critical Element 2 – Specific operating regulations.....	19
5.4 Critical Element 3 – State system and functions	20
5.5 Critical Element 4 – Qualified technical personnel.....	22
5.6 Critical Element 5 – Technical guidance, tools, and provision of safety critical information	24
6 SSP Component 2: State safety risk management	26
6.1 Critical Element 6 – Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations.....	26
6.2 Safety management system (SMS) obligations	28
6.3 Accident and incident investigation	30
6.4 Hazard identification and safety risk assessment	31
6.5 Management of safety risks including Critical Element 8 “Resolution of safety issues”	34
7 SSP Component 3 – State safety assurance	34
7.1 Critical Element 7 – Surveillance obligations.....	35
7.2 State safety performance	36
7.3 Management of change	40
8 SSP Component 4: State safety promotion	40

8.1	Internal communication and dissemination of safety information.....	40
8.2	External communication and dissemination of safety information	41
APPENDIX I – [AMS NAME] SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES.....		43
APPENDIX II – LETTER OF COMMITMENT FOR THE SSP IMPLEMENTATION		45
APPENDIX III – SSP COORDINATION GROUP FRAMEWORK.....		47

Changes to this document will be achieved by a re-issue of the entire document rather than by the amendment of individual pages

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

The total number of copies of this SSP document is shown below. One printed copy of the manual has been designated as the “Master Copy”.

Some users are provided with a printed copy of the SSP document, while others are given an electronic copy. This is also indicated in the table below.

Copy No.	User	Print (P) Electronic (E)	Date provided	Signature

FOREWORD

Provide an introduction on the context of aviation in regard to the AMS. You may include or mention the international organisations the AMS is member of, ICAO for instance.

Next on, introduce the current involvement of the AMS in relation to SSP planning, implementation and deployment. You may also detail the safety efforts the State or national CAA is currently involved in.

[City of issue], [AMS of issue], [Month YYYY]

(Signature)

[Head of the CAA or Accountable Executive]

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Remove or add when necessary

[acronym of the CAA] Name of the CAA

[acronym of the aircraft accident investigation body] Name of the aircraft accident investigation body

[acronym of the specific operating regulation] Name of the specific operating regulation

[acronym of the technical guidance material] Name of the technical guidance material

ALoSP	Acceptable Level of Safety Performance
AMO	Approved Maintenance Organisation
ANS	Air Navigation Services
ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
AOC	Air Operator Certificate
AP-RASP	Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan
ATO	Approved Training Organization
CE	Critical Element
CFIT	Controlled Flight into Terrain
CPDLC	Controller Pilot Data Link Communications
Doc	Document
EI	Effective Implementation
GASP	Global Aviation Safety Plan
GCOL	Ground Collision
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
iSTARs	Integrated Safety Trend and Reporting System
LOC-I	Loss of Control In-flight
MAC	Mid-Air-Collision
NASP	National Aviation Safety Plan
NOTAM	Notice to AirMen
NSC	National Safety Committee
PBN	Performance-Based Navigation
PQ	Protocol Question
RAMP	Routine Airport Maintenance Program
RE	Runway Excursion
RI	Runway Incursion
SARPs	Standards and Recommended Practices
SDCPS	Safety Data, Collection and Processing Systems

SIT	SSP Implementation Team
SMS	Safety Management System
SPI	Safety Performance Indicator
SPT	Safety Performance Target
SRM	Safety Risk Management
SSP	State Safety Programme
SWG	SSP Working Group
USOAP	Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme

DEFINITIONS

Remove or add when necessary

Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down, in which:

a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:

- being in the aircraft, or
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have become detached from the aircraft, or
- direct exposure to jet blast,
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or

b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:

- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteristics of the aircraft, and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected component,
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing tips, antennas, tires, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or

c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP): The minimum level of safety performance of civil aviation in a State, as defined in its State safety programme, or of a service provider, as defined in its safety management system, expressed in terms of safety performance targets and safety performance indicators.

Accountable executive: A single, identifiable person having responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of the service provider's SMS.

Aeroplane: A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.

Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface.

Change management: A formal process to manage changes within an organisation in a systematic manner, so that changes which may impact identified hazards and risk mitigation strategies are accounted for, before the implementation of such changes.

Defences: Specific mitigating actions, preventive controls or recovery measures put in place to prevent the realization of a hazard or its escalation into an undesirable consequence.

Hazard: A condition or an object with the potential to or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident.

Incident: An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.

Risk mitigation: The process of incorporating defences, preventive controls or recovery measures to lower the severity and/or likelihood of a hazard's projected consequence.

Safety: The state, in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level.

Safety data: A defined set of facts or set of safety values collected from various aviation-related sources, which is or partially used to maintain or improve safety.

Note. — Such safety data is collected from proactive or reactive safety-related activities, including but not limited to:

- a) accident or incident investigations;
- b) safety reporting;
- c) continuing airworthiness reporting;
- d) operational performance monitoring;
- e) inspections, audits, surveys; or
- f) safety studies and reviews.

Safety information: Safety data processed, organized or analysed in a given context so as to make it useful for safety management purposes.

Safety Management System (SMS): A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures.

Safety objective: A brief, high-level statement of safety achievement or desired outcome to be accomplished by the State safety programme or service providers' safety management system.

Note. – Safety objectives are developed from the organisation's top safety risks and should be taken into consideration during subsequent development of safety performance indicators and targets.

Safety oversight: A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organisations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations.

Safety performance: A State or a service provider's safety achievement as defined by its safety performance targets and safety performance indicators

Safety Performance Indicator (SPI): data-based parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance

Safety Performance Target (SPT): The State or service provider's planned or intended target for a safety performance indicator over a given period that aligns with the safety objectives

Safety risk: The predicted probability and severity of consequences or outcomes of a hazard

State Safety Programme (SSP): An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety

Serious Incident: An incident involving circumstances indicating that there was a high probability of an accident and associated with the operation of an aircraft which, in the case of a manned aircraft, takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, or in the case of an unmanned aircraft, takes place between the time the aircraft is ready to move with the purpose of flight until such time as it comes to rest at the end of the flight and the primary propulsion system is shut down

Service Provider: Includes approved or certified flight training organisation, air operator, aircraft maintenance organisation, organisation responsible for type design or manufacture of aircraft, air navigation service provider and aerodrome operator

Surveillance: The State activities through which the State proactively verifies through inspections and audits that aviation license, certificate, and authorization or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State

System: An organized, purposeful structure that consists of interrelated and interdependent elements and components, and related policies, procedures and practices created to carry out a specific activity or solve a problem

PART 1 - GENERAL

1 Purpose of this document

ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) contained in Annex 19 and Doc 9859 now require Member States to establish a State safety programme (SSP). This requires States to establish an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at the management of safety in the State, in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP) in civil aviation.

The ALoSP is the means to verify the satisfactory performance of the SSP and service providers' safety management systems (SMS).

The SSP consists of four main components, resembling an SMS concept at the level of the State:




Figure 1. SSP and ALoSP

It is important to distinguish between the SSP and the so-called 'SSP Top-level (Exposition) Document' (this document). The said document includes the SSP's structure and its associated programmes, and how its various components work together, as well as the roles of the different State aviation authorities.

This document, therefore, will provide the "blueprints," which will guide [AMS name]'s journey toward effective SSP, and continuous improvement of safety performance.

2 Introduction to [AMS name] State safety programme

The SSP of [AMS name] is a management system used for regulating and managing safety in our State. SSP implementation in [AMS name] is conducted in accordance with the size and complexity of our civil aviation system and requires intensive coordination among the authorities responsible for aviation functions.

The SSP is being implemented in [AMS name] based on the provisions contained in Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the procedures established in ICAO Doc 9859. The SSP defines the specific safety activities that we will continue to conduct in order to fulfil the State's responsibilities concerning the safe and efficient performance of aviation activities.

[AMS name] has an SSP that provides the [acronym of the State's CAA] with a regulatory safety management system, while its service providers have to establish and maintain their own safety management systems (SMS).

In addition to addressing the ICAO SSP framework, the SSP provides an overview of the commitments of [AMS name] to the safety management and air navigation system at the national level, with the aim to:

- a) Ensure the State has an effective legislative framework in place with supporting specific operating regulations
- b) Ensure safety risk management and safety assurance coordination and synergy among relevant State authorities
- c) Support effective implementation and appropriate interaction with the service provider's SMS
- d) Facilitate the monitoring and measurement of the safety performance of the State's aviation industry
- e) Maintain and continuously improve the overall safety performance in [AMS name]

3 [AMS name] challenges and priorities

3.1 Challenges

Provide national information about challenges related to the aviation sector. Examples of this may be the following:

- *a change of paradigm in the involvement of the State in the sector;*
- *functional separation of the duties of the State;*
- *political change;*
- *forecasted traffic and ATM;*
- *etc.*

Information can be sourced from reference agents such as IATA or CAPA, outlooks published by ICAO, national plans published by each AMS, Ministry of Transport analysis, etc. The challenges may be separated in different sections, each one offering a succinct description.

3.2 Global, regional and national priorities

The goals outlined below are those contained in the ICAO GASP. For further contextualization and a better understanding of the regional characteristics, further goals could be added which cater to the specific ASEAN region (consult ICAO's Asia-Pacific Regional Aviation Safety Plan-AP-RASP- or other publications focusing in the ASEAN region). You may also reach out to other State's SSP exposition documents found in the same region.

The 2020-2022 edition of the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) developed by ICAO sets out a strategy that supports the prioritization and continuous improvement of civil aviation safety and sets out six global aviation safety goals and its associated targets:

Goal	Target
Goal 1: Achieve a continuous reduction of operational safety risks	Maintain a decreasing trend of global accident rate
Goal 2: Strengthen States' safety oversight capabilities	All States to improve their score for the effective implementation (EI) of the Critical Elements (CEs) of the State's safety oversight system (with focus on priority PQs) as follows: By 2022 – 75% By 2026 – 85% By 2030 – 95% By 2022, all States to reach a positive safety oversight margin, in all categories
Goal 3: Implement effective State safety programmes (SSPs)	By 2022, all States to implement the foundation of an SSP By 2025, all States to implement an effective SSP, as appropriate to their aviation system complexity
Goal 4: Increase collaboration at regional level	By 2020, States that need support in categories with safety oversight margins below zero, to use a regional safety oversight mechanism another State or other safety oversight organisation's ICAO-recognized functions

	<p>By 2022, all States to contribute information on safety risks, including SSP safety performance indicators (SPIs), to their respective regional aviation safety group (RASGs)</p> <p>By 2022, all States with a positive safety oversight margin, and an effective SSP, to actively lead RASGs' safety risk management activities</p>
<p>Goal 5: Expand the use of industry programmes</p>	<p>By 2020, all service providers to use globally harmonized SPIs as part of their safety management system (SMS)</p> <p>By 2022, increase the number of service providers participating in the corresponding ICAO recognized industry assessment programmes</p>
<p>Goal 6: Ensure the appropriate infrastructure is available to support safe operations</p>	<p>By 2022, all States to implement the air navigation and airport core infrastructure</p>

Table 1. ICAO GASP Goals and Targets

At the same time, the diversity of the ASEAN region, coupled with forecasts predicting continuing strong growth over the next decade, pose significant challenges for regional aviation safety. With these developments and challenges in mind, a number of regional priorities have been established for the ASEAN region. These include the:

- Reduction in Operational Risks;
- Improvements in Safety Oversight and Compliance;
- Consistent and effective safety management system (SMS) and State Safety Programme (SSP);
- Data-driven regulatory oversight; and
- Enhanced aviation infrastructure (physical and institutional).

[AMS name] is committed to actively work with ICAO, international and regional partners to advance aviation safety, and to achieve these priorities and implement safety measures that support a seamless aviation system in the region and a harmonized global system through the continuous monitoring, assessment, and management of our State safety programme (SSP) and the National aviation safety plan (NASP), which priorities are developed in detail in a separate document.

4 [AMS name] aviation system description. Size and complexity of the national industry

The understanding of the size and complexity of a State's aviation system and the interactions between the elements is fundamental to planning the SSP. One of the main inputs of the State system description is the size and complexity of the industry operating in [AMS name].

The following table includes a summary of the service providers operating in [AMS name], its main activities and interfaces that need to be assessed for hazard identification and safety risk assessment.

Outline and describe the service providers operating in the State. Find below an example

▪ **Aviation Organisations:**

- Companies with Spanish Air Operator's Certificate: TBD
- Maintenance and Airworthiness Management Organizations (CAMO): TBD
- Maintenance Organizations: TBD
- Aircraft maintenance technician training organisations: TBD
- Flight schools: TBD
- Design and production organizations: TBD

▪ **Licenses:**

- Maintenance Technician Licenses: TBD
- Pilot Licenses: TBD
- Private Pilot Licenses: TBD
- Cabin Technician Licenses: TBD
- Airborne examiners: TBD
- Aeronautical doctors: TBD
- Aeronautical Medical Centers: TBD

▪ **Foreign companies:**

- Accredited companies: TBD
- Unscheduled operations: TBD

▪ **Aerial works:**

- Companies of air works: TBD
- Companies with Special Operations Certificates: TBD

▪ **Aircraft registration:**

- Number of registered aircraft: TBD
- Aircraft over 5700 kg: TBD

▪ **Drones (RPAs):**

- Qualified operators: TBD

▪ **Navigation Area:**

- XX FIRs
- Extensive network of air navigation systems
- XX TWRs and XX Control Centres
- XX Radio installations to assist navigation (ILS, VOR, Radar...)
- State-controlled airspace: XX M Km2

▪ **Liberalised air navigation services:**

- ANSPs certified: TBD
- Certified Air Traffic Controller Training Organisations: TBD
- XX TWRs and XX AFIS services

PART II – STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME COMPONENTS

With the publication of the Second Edition of Annex 19, and the Four Edition of the Safety Management Manual (Doc. 9859) the SSP is no longer described as a framework, but rather as a programme to meet the State's safety management responsibilities, which includes safety oversight. So, the SSP is part of the broad concept of State safety management. This evolution is illustrated in the following figure.




Figure 2. SSP Components

5 SSP Component 1: State safety policy and objectives

The first SSP component defines how [AMS name] will manage safety throughout its aviation system, including the requirements, obligations, functions, and activities of the different State aviation authorities related to the SSP, as well as the broad safety objectives to be achieved.

The State's legal framework dictates how aviation safety will be managed. This framework also applies to service providers, which are legally responsible for the safety of their products and services and must be in compliance with the safety regulations established by the State.

5.1 [AMS name] safety legislative framework

The legislative system in [AMS name] for civil aviation comprises three tiers:

1. Primary aviation legislation (CE-1): [name and acronym of the State's primary aviation law/legislation]
2. Specific operating regulations: [name and acronym of the State's specific operating regulation]
3. Guidance material: Supporting technical guidance material for service providers such as [name and acronym of the State's guidance material] and other [acronym of the State's CAA] relevant documents (e.g., [names of other documents] manuals, handbooks...)

Including a descriptive figure may be beneficial to present the legislative document hierarchy of the AMS. A potential example is included below.



Figure 3. [AMS name] safety legislative pyramid

5.2 Critical Element 1 – Primary aviation legislation

Primary aviation legislation is essential for the creation of the appropriate environment for a well-managed aviation activity within the State. [AMS name] has a national aviation safety legislative framework that regulates its civil aviation activities and that provides the basic framework for enabling and ensuring an effective and robust State safety oversight system (SSO) consistent with ICAO provisions and annexes.

Describe the primary law governing aviation in your State, including a link to the site it is published. Consider mentioning the points that the law addresses, how it describes the different State stakeholders in relation to aviation safety and the legal provisions in relation to the State's safety obligations and oversight

5.3 Critical Element 2 – Specific operating regulations

A regulation is a general statement issued by the [acronym of the State's CAA] that has the force and effect of law. *Describe how the specific operating regulations in your State are organised, i.e., whether they are separated in parts for each service provider or domain or any other division.*

In order to ensure the effectiveness of the safety oversight system, proposals for modifications are carried out in consultation with the industry and other stakeholders.

The example below shows a compact and informative description of the specific operating regulations. Consider summarising your State's specific operating regulations and each of the domains addressed.

The [acronym of the State's CAA] has developed and published a comprehensive set of specific regulations, as outlined in the table below:

Modify as deemed necessary

Regulation No.	Name
Part 01	General Policies, Procedures and Definitions
Part 02	Personnel Licensing
Part 03	Approved Training Organisations
Part N	...

Table 2. [AMS name] Specific Operating Regulations

In formulating these, [AMS name] has followed ICAO SARPs to ensure that the industry is regulated on the basis of recognized industry best practices.

All [AMS name]'s aviation regulations are available to the public free of charge at [acronym of the State's CAA]'s website:

[Link to the State CAA website containing the specific operating regulations]

5.3.1 Means of compliance

Describe the publications containing the acceptable means of compliance of the CAA.

Describe the regulation category that provides means of complying with the precepts found in the specific operating regulations. For instance, the FAA proposes the so-called Implementing Standards, whereas EASA publishes Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) for service providers.

5.4 Critical Element 3 – State system and functions

Include a description of the hierarchical composition of the state regarding its aviation system, the responsibilities and where is the CAA emplaced.

Describe the hierarchical position of the CAA within the state and a brief description of its functions. The example below follows a typical hierarchy in many countries where the CAA is dependent from the Ministry of Transport.

Example: The [acronym of the State's CAA] is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport. Sections **Error! Reference source not found.** and **Error! Reference source not found.** describe the roles and responsibilities of the different directorates of the [acronym of the State's CAA] in relation to civil aviation and the coordination of the SSP activities.

5.4.1 Organisation responsible for coordinating the SSP

Provide a description of the legal and regulatory framework describing the duties and responsibilities for the different stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of the SSP.

Describe the legal provisions which entitle the CAA or the State body tasked with planning, implementing, and monitoring the SSP.

The responsibilities of the [acronym of the State's CAA] comprise the compliance with ICAO SARPs, the State's Safety Programme, and the resources for the establishment, oversight, and maintenance of the regulatory frame. This includes the directives to plan, organize, develop, control, and continuously improve the State's safety programme in a manner that meets [AMS name]'s safety needs.

5.4.2 SSP functions and activities

The SSP functions and activities which comprise the acceptance and monitoring of service provider's SMS and its implementation, in compliance with [acronym of the State's regulations], are already exercised by existing directorates and business units within the [acronym of the State's CAA].

The governance structure of the [acronym of the State's CAA] is commensurate with the complexity of [AMS name]'s aviation system.

In order to contextualize the following sections, consider including in this section the organisation chart of your national CAA (or the authority responsible for the implementation of the SSP).

[Include the organisation chart of the AMS CAA]

At present, the main responsibilities with regard to SSP definition and implementation fall under the following [name of the units of the CAA: Directorates, Deputies, Chiefs...] whose responsibilities are described below:

- a) [Name of Unit 1 with SSP responsibilities]
- b) [Name of Unit 2 with SSP responsibilities]
- c) [Name of Unit N with SSP responsibilities]

The obligations, functions, and roles of each directorate and department are clearly defined in the document [name and code of the document describing the organisation structure of the CAA as well as their unit's and department's functions and responsibilities]. This document helps each directorate/department to understand its contribution to meeting each ICAO Annex 19 requirements and their responsibility for managing safety in [AMS name].

Introduce and describe the CAA units and departments aforementioned with SSP responsibilities. You may present its structure and responsibilities as well as the duties held in relation to the SSP.

5.4.3 Coordinating group for the maintenance and implementation of the SSP

[AMS name] has established a series of coordination groups for the development, implementation, and monitoring of the SSP.

The appointment of the SSP coordination groups facilitates good communication, avoids duplication of effort and conflicting policies, and ensures efficient and effective SSP implementation. These groups are made up of representatives from the [acronym of the State's CAA], [acronym of the State's aircraft accident investigation body], service providers, and [AMS Military Authority or equivalent military unit with which the CAA is tied and cooperates for SAR, assistance, ATC... if any] *add additional entities as deemed necessary.*

The details and terms of reference of the SSP Coordination Groups are included in **Error! Reference source not found.** of this document.

5.4.4 [AMS name] safety policy and objectives

[AMS name]'s safety policy projects the country's intentions, including commitment and direction to safety and to the promotion of a positive safety culture in the State.

The State safety objectives are high-level statements endorsed by the [responsible for endorsing the safety objectives, usually the Head/D-G of the CAA] of the [acronym of the State's CAA] to reflect the commitment by [AMS name] towards an effective SSP. These objectives have been established with a clear understanding of the highest safety risks in the [AMS name] aviation system and the country's priorities for the management of safety. They are used to provide direction for the establishment and achievement of the overall ALoSP by selecting the most appropriate SPIs and SPTs.

The detailed [AMS name] safety policy and objectives can be found in **Error! Reference source not found.** of this document.

5.4.5 [AMS name] safety resources

Briefly describe the funding scheme of the CAA (e.g., through charges levied on users, through State funds, a combination of both). Below there is an example for the typical funding scheme where the CAA obtains its resources through fees and charges.

Example: The [acronym of the State's CAA] is funded through fees and charges that support its regulatory and investigation activities. In order to ensure this, sufficient resources have been allocated at different levels so that the State Safety Policy is implemented and the State Safety Objectives are achieved.

5.4.6 SSP Top level (exposition) document

A soft copy of the SSP top-level (exposition) document will be made available to all regulatory staff having safety oversight responsibilities. Changes to the document will be achieved by a re-issue of the entire document rather than by the amendment of individual pages.

This document will be reviewed on an annual basis.

5.5 Critical Element 4 – Qualified technical personnel

[AMS name] is developing and implementing a training methodology and programme for all staff involved in the SSP development, implementation or monitoring to ensure they have the appropriate competency and knowledge.

The competencies to be acquired through training include, but are not limited to:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Briefing on SSP, SMS, safety policy, objectives and ALoSP (senior management oriented)
- b) SSP and SMS principles, how to conduct SMS assessments and evaluate service provider's SPIs and general compliance with safety (inspectors oriented)
- c) Training for aviation medical examiners and medical assessors
- d) Enhanced leadership skills
- e) Understanding of business processes
- f) Experience and judgment required to assess performance and effectiveness
- g) Safety risk-based surveillance
- h) Safety data collection and analysis
- i) Protection of safety data and information
- j) Enforcement policy training (legal personnel oriented)
- k) Safety performance measurement and monitoring
- l) Safety promotion activities

The training development programme comprises of:

- a) Initial Training: Introduction training, Basic training, Basic department training, and Specialized Training
- b) On-the-Job (OJT) Training
- c) Continuation Training

5.6 Critical Element 5 – Technical guidance, tools, and provision of safety critical information

The highest priority of [AMS name]'s aviation safety agencies is maintaining and enhancing aviation safety performance. In order to achieve this, a range of strategies and initiatives have been developed, that provide its personnel and service providers with a clear set of technical guidance ([names and/or acronyms of some technical material published by the CAA]) tools and resources (e.g., transportations means, offices and communication facilities, hardware and software, technical library) and safety-critical information (e.g., Advisory Circulars, NOTAMs, etc.) to ensure appropriate performance of safety-related duties. This includes the provision of technical guidance to the aviation industry in the form of [acronym of the guidance material] to explain how the regulatory provisions should be implemented within [AMS name].


5.6.1 Document structure within [acronym of the State's CAA]. Introduction

The legislative framework is underpinned by additional elements such as [names and/or acronyms of technical material published by the CAA]. The [acronym of the State's CAA] provides its personnel and service providers with a clear set of technical guidance, tools and safety-critical information, including:

Describe the technical documentation published by the [acronym of the State's CAA] as well as provide some examples of it. You may do so in a hierarchical manner, presenting first the higher level technical material and ending up with basic one, e.g., checklists and forms for internal personnel. The following

a) Technical guidance material:

- [Name and acronyms of the guidance material] including templates and standard formats for documents to be established by each service provided concern
- [acronym of the State's CAA] Manuals such as:
 - i. Training Manual & Policy
 - ii. Training programmes
 - iii. [acronym of the State's CAA] Audit Policy
 - iv. Enforcement Manual
 - v. SSP Top-level Exposition Document
 - vi. etc.
- Procedures and Working Instructions:
 - i. Inspection handbooks
 - ii. Directorate operation manuals
- Checklists and forms
 - i. [acronym of the CAA's specific operating regulations] compliance checklists



ii. SMS checklists

iii. OJT forms

iv. etc.

b) Tools:

- Transportation
- Offices
- Telephones and other communication facilities
- Computers
- Software
- Access to the internet
- Technical library

c) Safety-critical information:

- NOTAMs
- Safety and Airworthiness Directives (AD)
- Aeronautical maps
- Alerts

Next on, you may describe each technical guidance material category within the CAA in a specific subsection, for example:

- Section X.X Guidance material
 - Description
- Section X.X CAA Manuals
 - Description
- Section X.X Procedures and working instructions
 - Description
- Section X.X Checklists and forms
 - Description

6 SSP Component 2: State safety risk management

State safety risk management (SRM) is a key component of the State safety programme (SSP). The SSP is responsible for the surveillance of the service provider's safety management systems that include hazard identification, risk assessment, risk mitigation, and safety risk acceptance. It is important to recognize that this function is a continuing activity, since hazards, risk assessment, and the effectiveness of safety risk mitigation change over time.

Safety risk management in [AMS name] is a shared responsibility between the government aviation agencies and the service providers and industry, and it is of vital importance that all the stakeholders involved work collaboratively to produce the best safety outcomes.

The SSP recognizes the need for a transition towards a systems-based approach to safety oversight, along with risk-based surveillance. The identification and management of aviation safety risks is carried out through a multi-layered process that allows for the aggregation of systems and risk information into higher-order categories, to achieve an assessment of the level of risk across the whole aviation industry in the country.

The safety risk management framework includes the following State's requirements:

- a) Service providers to implement an SMS to manage and improve the safety of their aviation-related activities
- b) State to establish means to determine whether service providers' SRM is acceptable
- c) State to review and ensure that the service provider's SMS is in place and remains effective

6.1 Critical Element 6 – Licensing, certification, authorization and/or approval obligations

6.1.1 General considerations

Licensing, certification, authorization, and approval obligations are important components of the State safety risk control strategy that provide the State with the assurance that service providers and other industry agencies and organisations have achieved the required standards to operate safely.

For each certification file, a series of documents should be maintained, such as:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Certification application and associated documents
- b) Applicable service provider's manual
- c) Audit/inspection files including filled-in surveillance checklists and certification matrices, if applicable
- d) Corrective action plans and evidence of implementation of mitigation/prevention measures if applicable
- e) Exception or exemption files, if applicable (including safety studies and their assessment by the authority)

- f) Copy of the certificate, license, authorization or approval (and associated specifications, if applicable)

6.1.2 Personnel licensing

The [acronym of the State's CAA] is responsible for all aviation licensing in [AMS name], and its activities include, but are not limited to, the following:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Approval of training courses
- b) Approval of the use of simulation training devices and the authorization for their use, in order to gain the experience or demonstrate the skill required for the issue of a license or rating
- c) Approval, designation, and supervision of individuals or organisations delegated to perform specific tasks on behalf of the personnel licensing office
- d) Assessment and approval of applications for licenses and ratings
- e) Assessments of medical fitness relating to license requirements
- f) Issue of licenses and ratings
- g) Validation and conversion of licenses and ratings issued by other States

6.1.3 Certificates and approvals

The [acronym of the State's CAA] is responsible for the issuance of certifications and approvals to all training organisations, air operators, aircraft maintenance organisations, international aerodrome operators, and air navigation service providers. These types of organisations cannot operate unless they are granted a certificate or approval from the [acronym of the State's CAA]. Certification and approval activities include, but are not limited to:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Dealing with an expression of interest, including coordination with other concerned authorities
- b) Initial review of the documentation submitted by the service provider, including key personnel's competence and operating procedures
- c) On-site audits and/or inspections to verify technical aspects and assess the service provider's organisation, competence, and implementation of its operating procedures
- d) If necessary, assessment of exemption request and supporting documents (e.g., aeronautical studies) with on-site inspections as needed, resulting in the granting (or denial) of exemptions with corresponding mitigation measures (follow-up is covered by CE-7)
- e) Assessment of the corrective action plans submitted by the service provider to resolve findings and non-compliances and acceptance (or rejection) of corrective actions, mitigation measures, and associated timelines
- f) Issuance of the certificate or approval, with an indication of operating conditions (and limitations, if applicable)
- g) Renewal or continuing validity of the certificates after appropriate supervision

h) Transfer or surrender of certificates

6.2 Safety management system (SMS) obligations

An SMS is a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organisational structures, accountabilities, responsibilities, policies, and procedures. It aims to provide a structured and effective management approach in order to control safety risks in operations, taking into account the organisation's specific structures and processes.

The SMS is designed to continuously improve safety by identifying hazards, collecting and analysing data, and continuously assessing safety risks, and to proactively contain or mitigate risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents.

An effective SMS demonstrates to the [acronym of the State's CAA] the service provider's ability to manage safety risks and provides for effective management of safety at State level.

6.2.1 SMS regulatory requirements

To be deleted after editing: Keep in mind that, as per ICAO's requirements outlined in its Annexes, only the following service providers are required to implement a SMS: ATO, AOC, AMO, design organisations, ATS, and aerodrome operators.

[AMS name] requires the following service providers to implement and maintain an SMS:

- [Service provider 1]
- [Service provider 2]
- [Service provider N]

These service providers operating in [AMS name] are required to implement an SMS in compliance with [applicable SMS regulation for service providers].

You may provide a table displaying the services providers required to implement an SMS according to the State's specific operating regulations

A list of relevant regulations and specific operating regulations is shown below:

Modify as deemed necessary

Service Provider	Reference
Air Operator Certificate (AOC) Holders	[Specific operating regulation X]
Approved Maintenance Organizations (AMO)	[Specific operating regulation Y]
Approved Training Organizations (ATO)	[Specific operating regulation Z]
[Service provider XXX]	[Specific operating regulation W]

Figure 4. [Specific operating regulation acronym] SMS requirements

6.2.2 Initial acceptance and continuous surveillance of an SMS

Modify as deemed necessary

In [AMS name], certified service providers' operating expositions set out their safety goals and practices, which are assessed and approved by the [acronym of the State's CAA]. The Authority then conducts regular monitoring and surveillance to ensure that these expositions are met.

It is up to the service provider to decide how they will achieve the agreed safety goals, and how to manage their safety risks, subject to [acronym of the State's CAA]'s approval and oversight as appropriate.

The SMS of the service provider's must be made acceptable to the State at a level that:

- a) Identifies safety hazards
- b) Ensures the implementation of remedial actions necessary to maintain the agreed safety performance
- c) Provides for continuous monitoring and regular assessment of the safety performance
- d) Aims at continuous improvement of the overall performance of the safety management system

6.2.3 Acceptance of a service provider's SPI's and SPT's

Modify as deemed necessary

As a part of their SMS performance monitoring mechanism, the different service providers in [AMS name] are required to define their safety performance measurements, which refer to the indicators, alerts, and targets used to measure and monitor safety performance over time. These measurements consider the nature of operations, the safety objectives of the service providers, and the aviation safety risks.

Service providers' proposed SPIs are reviewed and accepted by the [acronym of the State's CAA] as part of the SMS acceptance and continuous surveillance. Service providers are also required to review their safety performance measures periodically to ensure the alignment with their safety objectives and predominant hazards and risks.

Information sources for safety performance monitoring and measurement include, but are not limited to:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Accident and serious incident investigation reports
- b) Mandatory occurrence reports
- c) Automatic/manual data capture systems
- d) Voluntary reports
- e) Hazard reporting
- f) Safety studies
- g) Safety reviews
- h) Safety surveys

i) Safety investigations

6.2.4 One SMS across multiple service providers

Modify as deemed necessary

In [AMS name], some approved organisations and service providers have developed a single SMS that includes under its scope the safety management obligations of each of the organisations included. This includes those parent organisations holding multiple certificates.

Whether this practice is present or develops in the future, inspectors from different organisations from the regulator are responsible for the oversight and monitoring of different service providers, and the [acronym of the State's CAA] guarantees that SMS monitoring policies and processes are consistently applied throughout the State, ensuring that:

Modify as deemed necessary

- There is evidence of management commitment for the consistent interpretation and application of regulations
- All oversight personnel has been appropriately trained for its duties
- Common policies, procedures, and auditing tools have been developed and implemented when different organisations require oversight and monitoring
- There is continuous communication between the responsible inspectors assigned to each service provider
- There are mechanisms to standardize the monitoring activities and to identify any issues that may arise
- The parent organisation has :
 - o Documented its policies and procedures for sharing safety data and information, decision making and allocation of resources
 - o Defined the roles and responsibilities and the accountability framework associated with its SMS
 - o Defined the organisational structure and interfaces between different systems and activities

6.3 Accident and incident investigation

Modify as deemed necessary

The air accident investigation in [AMS name] is the responsibility of the [name and acronym of the aircraft accident investigation body] which is a functionally separate and independent organisation directly reporting to the [State's body, e.g., Ministry of Transport, to which the aircraft accident investigation body reports to].

[Brief introduction to the aircraft accident investigation body goals and duties]

The accident investigation process has a pivotal role in the SSP, as it allows the State to identify contributing factors, system deficiencies, and any other potential failures within the aviation system, and to generate the necessary countermeasures to prevent recurrence. It actively contributes to the


continuous improvement of aviation safety and can support in the development of corrective action decisions and allocation of resources, and may identify necessary improvements to the aviation system.

6.4 Hazard identification and safety risk assessment

One of the most important roles of the [acronym of the State's CAA]'s SRM is the identification of hazards and emerging trends across the aviation system.

The collection of internal and external safety data and information is essential to achieving an effective SSP. Inputs can be received from any part of the aviation system, including accident investigations, service provider's safety investigations, airworthiness reports, medical assessments,

Safety risk management process



safety risk assessments, audit findings, and audit reports and safety studies and reviews.

Figure 5. Safety Risk Management process

The risk management process can be achieved in six stages, as it is shown in the above figure:

- **Hazard identification:** when and where the incident has occurred;
- **Hazard analysis:** what happened, how and why;
- **Consequences:** what is the severity of the safety risk;
- **Likelihood:** what is the probability of this safety risk happening again;
- **Tolerability:** safety risk assessment – probability vs severity matrix; and
- **Actions to take:** actions required to mitigate the safety risk.

6.4.1 Hazard identification

Hazard identification in [AMS name] is achieved by collecting representative data from multiple sectors, through a systematic process that comprises:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Access to the data sources of the service providers and other industry agents such as ICAO through its RASGs and PIRGs to support the management of safety risk in the State;
- b) Review of outputs of internal and external investigation reports, considering as well those hazards that are generated outside the organisation and those that are outside the direct control of the organisation;
- c) Safety analysis team with the appropriate skills, experience, and training in a variety of hazard analysis techniques; and

d) Hazard analysis tools.

6.4.1.1 Mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting systems

[AMS name] encourages a positive reporting culture where all stakeholders are willing to report any incident or accident that occurs within the aviation system, and any mistakes they make.

Outline and describe the characteristics of the State's mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting systems

Describe the efforts and steps that the State/CAA has made (or is making) in order to implement mandatory and voluntary occurrence reporting systems.

6.4.1.2 Safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS)

The SDCPS refers to processing and reporting systems, safety databases, information exchange systems, and recorded information, and includes:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Accident and incident investigation data and information;
- b) Data and information concerning safety investigations conducted by the State authorities or service providers;
- c) Data and information resulting from safety oversight activities conducted by the regulatory authority;
- d) Mandatory safety reporting systems;
- e) Voluntary safety reporting systems; and
- f) Self-reporting systems, including automatic and manual data capture systems.

Outline and describe the characteristics of the State's SDCPS.

Find below an example description of an ongoing implementation of a SDCPS by a CAA:

[AMS name] is working towards the establishment of the safety data collection and processing system (SDCPS) for capturing, storing, aggregating, and allowing for the analysis of safety data and information. Its main objective is to develop the tools for hazard analysis and the assessment of its severity and probability. This system will consist of several databases that centralize the information in the safety SSP database.

6.4.2 Safety risk assessment

Safety risk assessment process in [AMS name] aims at evaluating the tolerability of the identified risks based on their calculated or estimated probability and their severity. This process allows for:

- a) Risk prioritization
- b) Determination of safety risk probability, safety risk severity, and safety risk tolerability
- c) Determination of the safety risk mitigation strategies (e.g., avoidance, reduction or segregation)

6.5 Management of safety risks including Critical Element 8 “Resolution of safety issues”

Modify as deemed necessary

One of the main functions of the [acronym of the State’s CAA] in accordance with the [primary aviation law name] is to regulate the safety of civil aviation operations within the territory of [AMS name] and the operation of aircraft of [AMS name] outside its territory, including the development of effective oversight strategies to ensure compliance with aviation safety requirements.

Outline and describe the state, efforts, characteristics of the CAA’s safety risk management.

Find below an example description of an ongoing implementation of a safety risk management system in a certain State:

[AMS name] is currently working on the development of a process for the management of safety risks to ensure control over the existing and potential safety issues and that ALoSP is achieved in the State.

This process will ensure that where and when there is a specific safety issue, it will be assessed to determine the risk level, the likely causes, and underlying factors, the opportunities for improvement, and the candidates for safety risk controls. Before implementing such controls, they will be evaluated and selected based on:

- a) Effectiveness*
- b) Benefit-cost ratio*
- c) Practicability*
- d) Acceptability*
- e) Enforceability*
- f) Durability*

Once safety risk controls have been selected and implemented, monitoring and validation mechanics will be activated.

7 SSP Component 3 – State safety assurance

Safety oversight based on a safety management system approach is sustained by mutual responsibility and accountability, rather than a more prescriptive approach aimed exclusively at regulatory compliance. This increases the service provider’s responsibility to focus on safety throughout the organisation’s structures, policies, and procedures.

Safety assurance helps the State to ensure that that the [acronym of the State’s CAA] is correctly exercising its regulatory functions that constitute safety risk control within the country’s aviation system, and it is accomplished through safety oversight of the service providers.

7.1 Critical Element 7 – Surveillance obligations

The primary objective of conducting surveillance is to determine whether a service provider or authorization holder is correctly fulfilling their obligations and regulations. Surveillance assesses their ability to manage safety risks and willingness to comply with legislation, including compliance with an SMS if needed.

Modify as deemed necessary

The [acronym of the State's CAA] has established a documented surveillance process (compliance-based) to plan all its surveillance responsibilities, including audits and inspections, on a continuous basis to ensure that service providers meet the established requirements.

These inspections aim to ensure that effective safety risk controls are appropriately integrated into the service providers' SMS, that they are being carried out as designed, and that the safety risk controls have the intended effect on safety risks.

Modify as deemed necessary

In line with the introduction of ICAO Annex 19, and once the compliance-based system is mature enough, the [acronym of the State's CAA] will analyse the implementation of a risk-based approach surveillance (Risk-Based Oversight 'RBO') for the planning of its surveillance activities. Therefore, until this moment, the surveillance programmes of the [acronym of the State's CAA] Inspectorate units will use a time-based approach (2-3 years period).

Modify as deemed necessary

The future RBO, when fully implemented through [acronym of the State's CAA], will consider the size and complexity of the service provided when planning and performing surveillance activities. Therefore, the frequency of surveillance will depend on risk management criteria of each area in order to target service providers with poor compliance and performance or safety records for more frequent audits/inspections. The RBO approach will consider the following factors among others (non-exhaustive list):

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) agreed risk indicators (when applicable)
- b) the number of operations served by the service provider's unit
- c) personnel resources available
- d) the criticality of the service provider's units
- e) rate of accident and/or incident reports
- f) time from the last audit/inspection;
- g) financing or budgets
- h) performance of compliance records
- i) Other factors

7.1.1 Safety oversight of operators and service providers

Oversight is the mechanism whereby [acronym of the State's CAA] monitors the safety status and the level of maturity of authorization holders. The oversight components include:

- a) Trained and skilled technical personnel, with specific training in SMS
- b) Procedures and documented guidance material for acceptance and oversight of the associated safety processes
- c) Licensing, certification, authorization, and approval
- d) Oversight activities, including scheduled and unscheduled audits and inspections, data collection and exchange, analysis, workflow management, and information management

The main objective of oversight activities is to determine whether an authorization holder is complying with its obligations and the regulations. Non-compliances, deficiencies, or improvements may be identified during surveillance activities. When identified, the service provider concerned will be required to take appropriate actions within a stipulated timeframe to get back to a safe state, so as to be able to continue their service provision.

Where safety risk is assessed to intolerable, enforcement actions such as suspension or imposing conditions on particular activities may be taken.

7.1.2 Service provider's safety performance monitoring

[Acronym of the State's CAA] periodically reviews each service provider's SPIs and SPTs, taking into consideration the performance and effectiveness of each one. This review aims to address the need to make adjustments to support continuous safety improvement.

7.2 State safety performance

7.2.1 General

Safety performance management, if well implemented, provides the State with the means to determine whether its activities and processes are working effectively to achieve its safety objectives. This is accomplished through the identification of Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs), which are used to monitor and measure safety performance and provide information that allows the senior management to be aware of the current situation and support decision-making.

[AMS name] safety performance management is about asking and answering the four most important questions regarding safety management:

- a) What are the top safety risks in [AMS name]?
- b) What does the State want to achieve in terms of safety, and what are the top safety risks that need to be addressed?
- c) How will the organisation know if it is making progress towards its safety objectives?
- d) What safety data and safety information are needed to make informed safety decisions (including the allocation of the organisation's resources)?

7.2.2 Acceptable Level of Safety Performance (ALoSP)

ICAO's Annex 19 – "Safety Management" requires the States to establish an ALoSP as part of its SSP and as part of its operators' SMS. An ALoSP is designed to be the mechanism to verify the operational performance of an SSP or SMS, through three key elements:

- Safety Performance Indicators (SPIs): short-term, measurable safety performance outcomes of an aviation operation or a sector of the industry
- Safety Performance Targets (SPTs): long-term, strategic, measurable safety performance outcomes of an aviation operation or a sector of the industry
- Safety requirements: the tools and means to achieve the safety performance indicators and targets of an SSP, including operational procedures, technology, systems, and programmes

An ALoSP requires the State to consider the effectiveness of the following four components:

- a) The State's implementation of the SSP
- b) Service Provider's implementation of SMS
- c) The management of aviation safety risk and associated SPIs
- d) The implementation of each of these elements through its aviation safety system




Figure 6. State safety objectives

7.2.3 Safety performance indicators and safety performance targets

SPIs and targets monitor:

- a) Safety outcomes such as accidents, incidents, and injuries (safety-outcome oriented); and
- b) The enablers, in terms of systems and processes required to maintain effective safety management at authority and organisation levels (process-based oriented).

Setting safety performance targets is considered more relevant for process-based indicators to drive positive system 'behaviours'.

Describe the indicators that the CAA will employ in order to measure the safety performance of the aviation system; consider including a figure/table displaying some of those.

The following is an example of the description of the said indicators. Consider including a similar table with the ones being used or proposed to be used.

The [acronym of the State's CAA] is working on the development of its SPIs and SPTs to monitor the safety performance of the aviation system and to establish the State's ALoSP. The SPIs and its associated SPTs will reflect the specific operational environment of [AMS name] and will help in identifying how safety risks are being controlled.

*For safety-outcome-related metrics, which are derived from occurrence data, the following indicators included in **Error! Reference source not found.** are proposed for review and approval.*

Indicator	Target	Actual performance	Existing controls
<i>Flight Operations Domain related SPIs:</i>			
<i>Fire/Smoke/Fumes (FIRE) per 100,000 flight hours</i>			
<i>Loss on control in-flight (LOC-I) per 100,000 flight hours</i>			
...
<i>Air Navigation and Aerodrome Domain related SPTs:</i>			
<i>Airborne Separation Minima Infringement (ASMI) per 100,000 movements</i>			
<i>Level Bust per 100,000 movements</i>			
...
<i>Airworthiness Domain related SPTs</i>			
<i>Maintenance Interval Exceedance (CAMO) Air Carrier per 100,000 flight hours.</i>			
<i>Maintenance Interval Exceedance (CAMO) Air Transport per 100,000 flight hours.</i>			
...
<i>XXX related SPT</i>			
...

Table 3. Safety-outcome indicators

For Process-outcome-related metrics, the following indicators included in Table 4 are proposed:.

Indicator	Target	Actual performance	Existing controls
<i>State safety oversight capability (USOAP EI indicator)</i>			
<i>State progress with SSP implementation</i>			

(ICAO iSTARS)			
...

Table 4. Process-outcome indicators

A periodic review of the SPIs is essential, as the aviation system is dynamic and constantly changing. New safety issues may arise; processes may change.

The [acronym of the State's CAA] ensures the update and refinement of the safety objectives on an annual basis, and its associated SPIs and SPTs.

7.2.3.1 Actions to be taken when SPTs are not met

If any of the SPTs is not met, an evaluation may be done by the SSP Implementation Team (SIT) to better understand why and to determine what actions should be taken. It could be because:

- a) The targets were not achievable or realistic;
- b) The actions taken to achieve the target were not appropriate or deviated from the original intent (practical drift);
- c) Changes in other safety risk priorities diverted resources away from meeting a particular target; or
- d) Emerging risks occurred that had not been considered when the targets were set.

The evaluation will be directed to understand root causes and for a management decision on whether the safety improvement is sufficient even if the target has not been met, and what further actions are required. This may require additional analysis that could identify some risk factors that were not addressed or maybe some risk mitigations in place that are not effective.

7.2.4 Implementation and maintenance of the SSP

In order to understand the existing gap between the current structures and processes in [AMS name] and those required for an effective SSP implementation, the [acronym of the State's CAA] will conduct a gap analysis through the ICAO iSTARS tool.

The gap analysis is expected to reveal the elements and processes identified as requiring actions to be introduced in the SSP implementation plan.

The SSP maintenance will be determined through several monitoring mechanisms, including:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Internal audits
- b) Review and feedback received from the SSP Coordination Group
- c) Aggregation and trend analysis of safety performance at the State level, such as:
 - Safety data analysis gathered from SDCPS
 - Internal and external audit reports
 - Aviation safety reports at the global level
 - Serious incident and accident reports
 - Safety performance measurements of service providers

7.3 Management of change

Changes are an ever-present fact in the contemporary aviation; when changes are introduced into a system, the established safety risk picture of the system will change, and these changes may introduce hazards that may impact the effectiveness of the existing defences.

Modify as deemed necessary

[AMS name] is developing a procedure for assessing the impact of changes at the State level. This procedure aims to allow [AMS name] to proactively identify the safety impact of change in the aviation system before it is implemented, and plan and execute proposed changes in a structured way.

Changes faced can be organisational and operational, and the management of change process will focus on those changes that could have a significant impact on the State's ability to fulfil its legal obligations and on the State safety management capabilities. Some changes that will be considered in the change management process are:

Modify as deemed necessary

- a) Reorganisation of the [acronym of the State's CAA]
- b) Changes in the SSP processes, including changes in methodology (SRM, safety assurance processes, etc.)
- c) Changes in the regulatory environment, such as changes in existing safety policies, programmes, and regulations
- d) Changes in the operational environment, such as the introduction of new technologies, changes in infrastructure, equipment or services
- e) Rapidly changing industry and its potential impact on the State oversight and performance monitoring capabilities

8 SSP Component 4: State safety promotion

To ensure the support of the core operational objectives of [AMS name]'s SSP, it is critical to implement an effective programme of safety promotion. Safety promotion is enhanced through staff training and better communication and dissemination of safety information.

8.1 Internal communication and dissemination of safety information

Safety promotion actions and publications can improve coordination and collaboration among different organisations involved with safety oversight within the State.

Describe the measures, efforts, tasks, and activities that the CAA is/has put in place in order to ensure optimal internal communication and dissemination of safety information.

The following example describes an ongoing implementation process for fulfilling the internal communication and dissemination of safety information goals

The [acronym of the State's CAA] is developing a training programme for providing mandatory and recommended SSP and SMS training to key technical staff. This training will be accompanied by educational and promotional products and will be communicated through various media, including informative bulletins sent by e-mail, informative sheets, and internal advertising.

In addition to the training programme, the [acronym of the State's CAA] is developing operational strategies for the communication of information amongst the different State aviation authorities, including:

- a) SSP documentation, policies, and procedures*
- b) Safety performance indicators*
- c) Sector safety performance information*
- d) Sector organisational safety risk profiles*
- e) Communication of system safety responsibility*
- f) Lessons learned from accidents and incidents*
- g) Concepts and best practices of safety management*

8.2 External communication and dissemination of safety information

Describe the measures, efforts, tasks, and activities that the CAA is/has put in place in order to ensure optimal external communication and dissemination of safety information.

The following example describes an ongoing implementation process for fulfilling the internal communication and dissemination of safety information goals

Externally, the [acronym of the State's CAA] is working in the development and establishment of communication platforms to facilitate SMS implementation and for the communication and dissemination of safety information with the aviation industry, in addition to the items to be communicated internally, such as:

- a) Guidance material for the SMS implementation*
- b) Importance of reporting*
- c) Identification of available safety training for the aviation community*
- d) Promote the exchange of safety information, with and among service providers, and between States*

Appendix guidance

This section should include any additional documentation that may support and expand the SSP top-level (Exposition) Document. The following pages contain examples that can be used for guidance. Please, review and/or update the cross-references across the document if the appendices are deleted, or new ones are added

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VERSION BASED ON THIS TEMPLATE!**

APPENDIX I – [AMS NAME] SAFETY POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

In line with the United Nations (UN), 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and, and the ICAO GASP 2020-2022 Edition, [AMS name] has an ‘aspirational goal’ to:

“Achieve and maintain zero fatalities in commercial operations by 2030 and beyond.”

This goal is deemed ‘aspirational’ as it represents an ambition of achieving an ever safer aviation system. It is intended to address all operational domains.

Moreover, in line with the regional priorities areas and with the aim to support this aspirational safety goal, [AMS name] is committed to the following national safety objectives:

Modify as deemed necessary

#	Objective
Objective 1	Achieve a reduction in operational risks
Objective 2	Improve in safety oversight and compliance
Objective 3	Ensure consistent and effective safety management system (SMS) and State Safety Programme (SSP)
Objective 4	Establish Data-driven regulatory oversight
Objective 5	Enhance aviation infrastructure to support safe operations
Objective N	...

Table 5. [AMS name] Safety Objectives

To achieve these objectives, the [AMS name] Government, through its agencies, will:

Modify as deemed necessary

1. Enable the implementation of innovative technologies where appropriate
2. Set policies and guidelines in line with the Standards and Recommended Practices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
3. Ensure its regulatory approach and intervention meet best practice principles to enable safe aviation, based on a comprehensive assessment of the level of risk related to particular aviation operators
4. Identify safety tendencies within the aviation sector and, where appropriate, adopt a data-driven risk-based and performance-based approach to address areas of safety concern or need
5. Investigate accidents, incidents, and non-compliances with aviation regulation and legislation to contribute to the preservation and continuous improvement of the safety and integrity of [AMS name]’s aviation system
6. Support the robust implementation and continuous improvement of SMS and SSP
7. Engage internationally (ICAO and the Asia-Pacific region, in particular) to deliver complementary safety outcomes

8. Boost the collection, analysis, protection, and sharing of relevant safety information at all levels of the aviation system to improve safety management
9. Encourage the collection of safety information, and its analysis and exchange amongst all relevant organisations and service providers within the aviation industry, with the objective of using that information for safety management purposes only
10. Monitor and measure continuously the aviation system's safety performance
11. Proactively cooperate and consult with the aviation sector, including the public, to recognise and address safety matters, to continuously enhance aviation safety
12. Instil good safety practices and positive safety culture within the aviation sector based on safety management principles
13. Assign and provide sufficient resources (financial and human) to equip aviation regulatory staff with the proper skills and expertise to discharge their safety oversight and management responsibilities competently
14. Ensure that systems that are externally supplied and services that impact upon the safety of [AMS name]'s operations, meet appropriate safety standards

Date: DD/MM/YYYY

Signed:

Minister of Transport

Head of the [acronym of the State's CAA]

Director of the [acronym of the aircraft accident investigation body] [Responsible of the Military Authority]

Director of the aviation Meteorological Authority

APPENDIX II – LETTER OF COMMITMENT FOR THE SSP IMPLEMENTATION

Safety assurance and management is the cornerstone for achieving a safety operational aviation environment in [AMS name]. These principles guide our actions to meet or exceed our customer and regulatory obligations in terms of safety, ensuring its alignment with global and regional safety priorities.

We hereby declare that,

Modify as deemed necessary

1. We strive to continuously work towards the achievement of safety effectiveness,
2. We agree to actively work towards the establishment and maintenance of an effective State Safety Programme (SSP) in [AMS name]
3. We agree to provide the employees with the resources, including information and training, which they require to understand and be competent in applying the required safety practices
4. We will continuously review the SSP to identify gaps and communicate to our team any threat or opportunity that must be considered to improve our safety performance

Date: DD/MM/YYYY

Signed:

Minister of Transport

Head of the [acronym of the State's CAA]

Director of the [acronym of the aircraft accident investigation body] [Responsible of the Military Authority]

Director of the aviation Meteorological Authority

APPENDIX III – SSP COORDINATION GROUP FRAMEWORK

In [AMS name], the SSP development, monitoring, and implementation is proposed to be managed at three different levels:

	Team Members	Assigned tasks	Frequency of meetings
Strategic NSC (National Safety Committee)	Chair: Director general of the CAA DG of the Military Authority DG of the Met Authority DG of the Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (AAIB)	→ Monitor ALoSP → Consider and approve SSP Implementation Team proposals → Define the strategic goals	Yearly
Tactical SIT (SSP Implementation Team)	Chair: Manager of the SSP Unit SSP Unit Managers of the following technical areas within CAA: OPS, AIR, PEL, AGA, ANS, etc Representative of the of the AAIB	→ Agree on safety risk priorities → Consolidate operational improvements → Develop the proposals to be approved by the NSC	Quarterly alternate internal & with industry
Operational SWG (SSP Working Group)	Chair: Manager of the SSP Unit SSP Unit CAA's Inspectors Service Providers representatives	→ Monitor SPIs and formulate actions → Define the top 5 risks by operational area → Coordinate local actions with service providers	As required, at least quarterly

Figure 7. SSP Coordination group implementation structure

- **Strategic – National Safety Committee (NSC):** a very high-level committee chaired by the Head of the [acronym of the State's CAA] and composed of the Director of the [acronym of the aircraft accident investigation body], [responsible of the Military Authority], and the Director of the aviation MET Authority. The NSC is responsible for monitoring the agreed ALoSP and for achieving the State safety objectives, ensuring the provision of the required resources, the implementation of the appropriate processes, and the efficiency of the results. The NSC meets on a yearly basis unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
- **Tactic – SSP Implementation Team (SIT):** chaired by the [title of the Head of the department of flight safety of the CAA] of the [acronym of the State's CAA], it is composed of the SSP Manager and team, and the heads (representatives) of the main technical areas within the [acronym of the State's CAA] (Flight Operations, Airworthiness, Personnel Licensing, Aerodromes, ANS) and the Director of the [aircraft accident investigation body]. The objective of the SIT is to monitor the ALoSP at a high-level consequence target by assessing the evolution of the SPIs. It meets quarterly unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.
- **Operational – SSP Working Groups (SWG):** committees chaired by the [title of the Head of the department of flight safety of the CAA] of the [acronym of the State's CAA] and composed of the SSP Manager and team, the [acronym of the State's CAA]'s inspectors and service provider's representatives. These working groups allow promoting an open exchange of safety data and information through an industry/State collaboration model to identify and mitigate State aviation safety risks and address negative safety trends. These groups facilitate the oversee of the effectiveness of the implementation of the SMS by each service provider according to the applicable regulations and the maturity and efficiency of their safety performance processes with regard to regional and global best practices. These working groups usually meet quarterly. At present, there is no evidence of operational working groups established in [AMS name], but these groups will be created in line with international best practices. *Some of the examples are listed hereunder:*

- ***National Runway Safety Working Group***
- ***CAMO and AMO Safety Working Group***
- ***National FDM sharing group***
- ***ANSP Safety Working group***

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